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LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF EDUCATIONAL
VOUCHERS
ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE"
In recent years, the concept of school choice has come to the
forefront of public debate. Once considered a heresy against the
creed of the common school, family choice proposals are slowly
gaining increased support from across the political spectrum and
promise to change the face of educational governance in
America.
There are a number of permutations on the choice theme,
including magnet schools within school districts, charter schools
which essentially are public schools freed from many regulatory
constraints and operated by outside groups, and school vouchers
awarded to parents for payment of tuition at private schools. The
voucher concept has proven the most problematic from both the
legal and policy perspectives. The inclusion of religiously
affiliated schools in these proposals forms the main point of
contention. In recent years, publicly funded voucher programs
have generated litigation in Florida, Ohio, and Wisconsin', while
voters in California, Colorado, Michigan, Oregon, and
Washington have overwhelmingly rejected direct ballot
initiatives for private school choice. The voucher question played
a role, to some degree, in the presidential campaign of 2000 and
marked a clear difference in policy perspective between the two
leading candidates.
A number of organized groups have rallied together in
opposition to the voucher concept. The most prominent among
these are People for the American Way, the National Education
Association, the American Federation of Teachers, the American
Civil Liberties Union, Americans United for Separation of
t Ph.D., LL.M., Columbia University. Professor of Law, St. John's University
School of Law.
1 See, e.g., Bush v. Holmes, 767 So.2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Simmons-
Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999), affg sub nom. Simmons-Harris v.
Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.
1998).
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Church and State, and the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People. Opponents perceive vouchers as
a threat to the public school system and a diversion of tax dollars
to private, and most significantly, religious schools. They raise
the specter of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and
various state constitutional prohibitions against public funding
of religious institutions.
The voucher concept has undergone a dramatic
transformation since economist Milton Friedman introduced his
free market proposal almost four decades ago. Friedman's idea of
a pure voucher scheme would have granted a government
subsidy to every elementary and secondary school student equal
to average per pupil expenditures. His system would have been
unregulated; the school could have been able to charge whatever
the market would bear. Inefficiently run schools would have lost
out in the competition of the marketplace. 2 The market theory
now appears to have given way to an equality model originally
advanced by John Coons and Stephen Sugarman, law professors
at the University of California at Berkeley, who looked to
vouchers as a means to advance education for the poor.3 Unlike
Friedman, who believed that family choice would equalize the
social and private costs of child-rearing, Coons and Sugarman
grounded their model in the belief that the family has a special
knowledge and understanding of the child and therefore can
make the most informed decision concerning the child's
education.4
Within this context, the voucher concept is seen as a vehicle
to promote equal educational opportunity and to bridge the
widening achievement gap between the rich and the poor and
particularly among minorities in urban areas. Fueled by the
failures of court-ordered desegregation, federally funded
remedial programs, and efforts to reform state financing systems
to equalize educational opportunities across the economic and
racial divide, it took almost two decades for their theory to take
hold. An unusual alliance has now been forged between the
2 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85-107 (The University of
Chicago Press 1962); see also JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS
AND AMERICAN SCHOOLS 186-91, 215-26 (The Brookings Institution 1990).
3 See JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE
CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL 7-16 (University of California Press 1978).
4 See id. at 52-61.
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political right and the left, one that has engaged business
leaders, advocates for the poor, and more recently African-
American political and educational leaders and clergy in a joint
effort to build on the success of religiously-affiliated inner-city
schools. 5 From the perspective of religious conservatives, school
vouchers would allow parents greater discretion and wrest their
children from an educational system that has lost its moral
compass.6
Supporters in particular draw on a series of Supreme Court
decisions beginning in the late 1980s where the Court upheld
various education aid programs from which funds, services, or
materials ultimately flowed to faith-based institutions.7 These
decisions, taken together, present several bright lines that may
or may not be dimming among the various factions of the current
Court. Among these lines are the following: (1) government aid
to pervasively sectarian institutions can only be indirect and not
direct; (2) aid must be allocated to a broad class of beneficiaries
on the basis of religiously neutral criteria; (3) aid must be
supplemental and not supplant the core educational program, at
least at the elementary and secondary levels; and (4) any
diversion of benefits to the school's religious mission must be de
minimus at most.
Having side-stepped the issue in 1998 when it denied
certiorari in a case from the Washington Supreme Court
upholding that state's voucher program, the Court has yet to
5 See JOSEPH P. VITERITTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 86-113 (The Brookings Institution 1999).
6 See ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, VISIONS OF SCHOOLING: CONSCIENCE,
COMMUNITY, AND COMMON EDUCATION 1-9 (Yale University Press 2000).
7 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding federal program
providing materials and equipment to public and nonpublic schools); Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding federally funded program offering
supplemental remedial instruction on neutral basis to disadvantaged students
attending schools); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819 (1995) (holding provision of funding by state university to student organization
that published newspaper with Christian point of view not in violation of
Establishment Clause); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)
(upholding provision of sign-language interpreter under federal Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act of deaf student attending religious school); Witters v.
Wash. Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding state
vocational rehabilitation program awarding assistance payments to a blind student
engaged in religious studies at Christian college); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983) (upholding state tax deduction allowed to parents of public and nonpublic
school children, including students attending religious schools).
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rule on a voucher program.8 Nevertheless, judging from the
Court's most recent pronouncement, in June 2000 in Mitchell v.
Helms,9 at least four Justices now interpret case precedent to
remove whatever constitutional barriers may have existed to the
point where even direct aid to religiously affiliated schools would
fall within the bounds of the Establishment Clause.10 Only time
will tell if that plurality can pull Justices O'Connor and Breyer-
the widely considered swing votes on the issue-over to the
voucher side. While their concurring opinion unequivocally
opposes direct aid to religious institutions, that is not an issue
with conventional voucher proposals. But they still express
reservations about funding the core educational program of
"pervasively sectarian" schools and the possibility that
government funds might be diverted to support their religious
mission." These may or may not prove to be stumbling blocks to
their endorsing a voucher program that includes adequate
administrative safeguards against widespread support of
religious teaching. Yet, even if the Court were to garner a
majority consensus on the constitutionality of school vouchers,
there still remains significant political skepticism over the
potential policy implications that could flow from such a
dramatic transformation in school governance and the
relationship between the state and organized religion.
This panel brings together four experts in the field of law
and education, each presenting interesting and individual views
on the legal and policy dimensions of the educational voucher
question. All of them have thoughtfully written on this topic
while some have played a role in key litigation and legislative
efforts. Their insights shed light on the contentious questions
underlying what has become one of the most heated debates in
education today.
8 See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997
(1998).
9 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
10 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801 (Thomas, J., plurality opinion).
1n See id. at 836.
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